Top-end inequality and growth: Empirical evidence by Tuominen, Elina
T A M P E R E  E C O N O M I C  W O R K I N G  P A P E R S
TOP-END INEQUALITY AND GROWTH:
  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Elina Tuominen
Working Paper 108
September 2016
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
FI-33014 UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE, FINLAND
ISSN 1458-1191
ISBN 978-952-03-0250-4
Top-end inequality and growth:
Empirical evidence
Elina Tuominen
University of Tampere, Finland (elina.tuominen@uta.fi)
September 2016
Abstract
New series of the top 1% income shares in 23 countries are used to investigate the
relationship between top-end inequality and subsequent economic growth from
the 1920s to the 2000s. The association is studied using different time-period
specifications, with a focus on data averaged over 5- and 10-year periods. To
address the issue related to chosen functional forms, penalized spline methods
are exploited to allow for nonlinearities. Empirical evidence suggests that the
association between top-end inequality and growth can be linked to the level
of economic development. The main findings relate to currently “advanced”
countries: the results show a negative relationship between top-end inequality
and subsequent growth in many settings, but the findings also suggest that this
association may become weaker in the course of economic development. “Less-
advanced” countries need to be studied further when more data become available.
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1. Introduction
Theoretical literature has suggested numerous competing channels from
income distribution to growth, and empirical studies have provided mixed
evidence on the inequality–growth association. The available inequality data
and the tradition of using linear specifications have been challenged, and
for these reasons the current study applies flexible methods to new inequal-
ity data. This study discusses the association between the top 1% income
shares and subsequent growth. Although top income shares describe the
upper part of the distribution, Leigh (2007) and Roine and Waldenström
(2015) provide evidence that these series also reflect changes in many other
inequality measures over time. Thus, these data bring new insights into the
inequality–growth literature. A brief and selective introduction to this litera-
ture is provided next (see, e.g., Voitchovsky, 2009, for a more comprehensive
overview).
Theoretical models suggest that inequality can both promote and ham-
per growth. One of the most common arguments that inequality enhances
growth is based on the classical approach: inequality channels resources to-
ward wealthier individuals who are assumed to have a higher propensity to
save; increased inequality may increase investment and thus also growth (e.g.,
Kaldor, 1957). Another widely mentioned mechanism is incentives: inequal-
ity encourages skilled individuals to increase their effort, which invigorates
economic performance. However, productive investments can be lost if some
individuals are not able to use their skills due to limited funds. The credit
market imperfection approach brings forward that credit constraints at the
lower part of the distribution inhibit growth: inequality reduces investment
in human capital, assuming that credit constraints are binding (e.g., Galor
& Zeira, 1993).1
Furthermore, Galor and Moav (2004) describe a unified theory that com-
bines two contradictory approaches at different stages of the development
process. Galor and Moav suggest that the classical channel dominates in
the early stages of development, at which time physical capital accumula-
tion is the main engine of growth. However, the credit market imperfection
mechanism starts to dominate in the next stages of the process, at which
1However, the economy’s income level affects this conclusion. Perotti (1993) illustrates
that in very poor economies only the rich may be able to attain education, and inequality
may correlate positively with investment in human capital.
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time human capital is the main source of growth. Finally, Galor and Moav
suggest that both mechanisms dim with development.
There are also other arguments that associate higher inequality with lower
future growth. As an example, inequality may reflect polarization of power.
The wealthy may have incentives to lobby against redistribution, thus pre-
venting efficient policies (Bénabou, 2000).2 Further, Galor et al. (2009) sug-
gest that inequality may bring out incentives for the wealthy to impede in-
stitutional policies and changes that facilitate human capital formation and
economic growth. In a more general perspective, Bénabou (1996) argues
that high overall inequality may give rise to sociopolitical instability, which
in turn reduces growth.
Early empirical inequality–growth studies relied on cross-sectional data,
but the focus has shifted to panel studies as new data have become available.3
In the 1990s, many cross-sectional studies found a negative link between in-
equality and growth (e.g., Bénabou, 1996; Perotti, 1996). However, many of
the early empirical results have been called into question. It has also been
suggested that the positive effects of inequality may materialize in the short
term, whereas the negative effects may set in more slowly.4 Some panel esti-
mations, such as Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000), have found a positive
short- or medium-run association between inequality and subsequent growth.
Recently, Halter et al. (2014) investigated the time dimension and suggest
that the long-run (or total) association between inequality and growth is neg-
ative. Moreover, Barro (2000) finds that high income inequality can hinder
growth in poor countries, whereas it can promote growth in rich countries.
Empirical literature has also suffered from the limited availability of high-
quality inequality data. Since its release, the panel data set constructed by
Deininger and Squire (1996) has been widely used despite its limitations.5
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) project provides high-quality data for
cross-country comparisons; unfortunately, using the LIS data results in a
fairly small sample size (as discussed by, e.g., Leigh, 2007). Voitchovsky
2Moreover, Aghion and Bolton (1997) suggest that redistribution creates greater equal-
ity of opportunity and enhances the the trickle-down process, which is assumed to stimulate
growth.
3Most results are based on Gini coefficient data.
4Many of the negative effects operate via political processes, institutional changes, and
human capital formation, all of which take time to materialize.
5Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) demonstrate these shortcomings.
3
(2005) utilizes the panel features of the LIS data primarily for wealthy coun-
tries and finds that inequality is positively associated with growth in the
upper part of the distribution, whereas inequality is negatively related to
growth in the lower part of the distribution.6
Studies by Banerjee and Duflo (2003) and Chambers and Krause (2010)
challenge, for example, Forbes (2000), who suggests a positive relationship
between inequality and growth. Banerjee and Duflo study various specifi-
cations, including kernel regression, with the “high quality” subset of the
Deininger–Squire data and find that changes in the Gini coefficient, in any
direction, relate to lower subsequent growth.7 Banerjee and Duflo argue
that nonlinearity may explain why the reported estimates vary greatly in the
literature. Furthermore, Chambers and Krause use semiparametric meth-
ods in their study with Gini coefficients from the World Income Inequality
Database. They find that higher inequality generally reduces growth in the
next 5-year period. They also provide some empirical support for the unified
theory of Galor and Moav (2004).
Growth regressions without inequality variables have been studied in non-
or semiparametric frameworks (e.g., Liu & Stengos, 1999; Maasoumi et al.,
2007; Henderson et al., 2012). These studies highlight that important fea-
tures of data are likely to be lost if linearity is forced into models. Further, the
results by Banerjee and Duflo (2003) and Chambers and Krause (2010) show
that linearity assumptions may be too restrictive in modeling the inequality–
growth association. The contradictory evidence in the literature may be a
consequence of misspecified models and low-quality inequality data. There-
fore, this study applies penalized spline methods to high-quality data.
This study exploits new and unprecedentedly long inequality series. The
top 1% income shares used in the current study describe top-end inequality
in 23 countries from the 1920s to the 2000s. The data are explored with
various time frequencies: annual data and data averaged over 5- and 10-
year periods. The role of top incomes in explaining growth has previously
been studied by Andrews et al. (2011), who exploit an adjusted data set from
Leigh (2007). Andrews et al. use the top 10% and top 1% income shares of 12
wealthy countries and rely mainly on standard linear estimation techniques.
6However, the inequality measures used by Voitchovsky (2005) do not emphasize the
very top of the distribution.
7Banerjee and Duflo (2003) also find some evidence for a negative relationship between
growth rates and inequality lagged one period.
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They find that after 1960, higher inequality may foster growth if inequality is
measured by the top 10% income share. Recently, this result was challenged
by Herzer and Vollmer (2013), who argue that the long-run effect of the top
10% share is negative. Moreover, in Andrews et al., many results for the top
1% share are not statistically significant. The small number of countries in
their sample and the possibility of nonlinearities motivate the current study
to investigate the top 1% further.8,9
This study finds a negative medium- to long-run relationship between top
1% income shares and subsequent growth, but this association may become
weaker in the course of economic development (as the level of per capita GDP
increases). This finding relates primarily to currently “advanced” countries
and is robust to various specifications. This study refrains from making
conclusions about the relationship in “less-advanced” countries due to sparse
data—“less-advanced” economies should be studied further when more data
become available.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The data and methods are
described in section 2. The empirical results and sensitivity analysis on the
findings are provided in section 3. Finally, section 4 presents conclusions.
2. Data and methods
2.1. Data
Using tax and population statistics, it is possible to compose long and
fairly consistent series on top income shares. Kuznets (1953) was the first
to use this kind of data to produce top income share estimates, and Piketty
(2001, 2003) generalized Kuznets’s approach. Following Piketty, different re-
searchers have constructed top income share series using the same principles
of calculation. Atkinson et al. (2011) provide a thorough overview of the top
income literature.10 This study focuses on the top 1% income share series
(note that this is pre-tax income). Most of the data are from “advanced”
8Andrews et al. (2011) also study the relationship of changes in top incomes to growth.
Their results are not in line with the finding of Banerjee and Duflo (2003). The association
between changes in the top 1% income share and subsequent growth is reassessed in a
follow-up study to the current paper (Tuominen, 2016).
9Moreover, Roine et al. (2009) study top incomes and growth, but they discuss deter-
minants of top-end inequality.
10In addition, see, for example, Atkinson (2007a) for the methodology. Piketty and
Saez (2006), Leigh (2007), and Roine and Waldenström (2015) discuss the advantages and
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economies such as Japan, as well as the English-speaking, Nordic, Conti-
nental European, and Southern European countries. Some “less-advanced”
countries are also included in the total sample of 23 countries. The years
from 1920 onward are studied, but the data set is not balanced. Appendix
A provides more information.
The debate about how to choose control variables is put aside consciously
because this study is not testing a specific channel from the top of the dis-
tribution to growth. The main goal is to explore possible nonlinearities and
the overall association. For this reason and due to data availability, two dif-
ferent approaches are taken in the empirical analysis. First, very long time
series are studied in parsimonious (henceforth, “simplified”) specifications
that include only the per capita GDP as a control variable to account for the
level of economic development. Second, shorter time series are exploited in
expanded models that include various additional covariates. Obviously, the
interpretation is different in these two approaches because the influence of
inequality may be channeled (at least to some extent) through some of these
variables.11
Information from the exceptionally long inequality series is utilized in the
simplified models that apply GDP per capita data 1920–2008 from Maddison
(2010). In the expanded specifications, most of the data are from the Penn
World Table version 7.0 (PWT 7.0) by Heston et al. (2011). The GDP per
capita data span 1950–2009, and the other variables are those commonly
used in growth regressions: government consumption, investment, price level
of investment, and trade openness.12 Moreover, the expanded models include
average years of secondary schooling, the data of which are available every five
years (Barro & Lee, 2010). More information on these variables is provided
in Appendix B. Table 1 shows summary statistics with the data averaged
over 5-year periods.
limitations of these series. The top income data are described in two volumes edited by
Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010). The updated data are also available in the World
Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo et al., 2015), and the data project is ongoing.
11Investment is an example of this kind of variable.
12Price level of investment is a commonly used proxy for market distortions. Openness
measure is defined as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Simplified models (data from the 1920s onward) N min mean max
top1t 291 3.0 10.1 23.4
ln(GDP p.c.)t 291 6.4 8.9 10.3
growtht+1 291 -15.2 2.3 16.1
Expanded models (data from the 1950s onward) N min mean max
top1t 204 3.0 8.6 16.9
ln(GDP p.c.)t 204 6.4 9.5 10.7
government consumptiont 204 4.0 9.5 18.6
investmentt 204 10.7 23.9 54.4
price level of investmentt 204 18.9 87.8 294.0
opennesst 204 8.0 61.6 386.3
schoolingt 204 0.1 2.2 5.4
growtht+1 204 -2.7 2.4 9.6
Data averaged over 5-year periods are used in the calculations.
The 5-year periods t are defined as 1920–24, 1925–29, ..., and 2000–04.
Growth refers to average annual log growth. See footnotes 18 and 22 for more details.
Sources: see Appendix A for the top 1% shares and Appendix B for other variables.
2.2. Methods
Additive models provide a flexible framework for investigating the link
between top-end inequality and growth.13,14 This study follows the approach
presented in Wood (2006). The basic idea is that the model’s predictor is a
sum of linear and smooth functions of covariates:
E(Yi) =X
∗
i θ + f1(x1i) + f2(x2i) + f3(x3i, x4i) + ...
In the above presentation, Yi is the response variable (here: average annual
future growth), X∗i is a row of the model matrix for any strictly parametric
model components, θ is the corresponding parameter vector, and the f• are
smooth functions of the covariates, x•.
13Additive models are a special case of generalized additive models (GAMs). GAMs were
introduced by Hastie and Tibshirani (1986, 1990). They present a GAM as a generalized
linear model with a linear predictor that involves a sum of smooth functions of covariates.
This study uses an identity link and assumes normality in errors, which leads to additive
models.
14In a recent study on determinants of top incomes, Roine et al. (2009) discuss the
problems of using a long and narrow panel data set. For example, GMM procedures are
not designed for settings where the number of countries is small but the series are long.
Roine et al. run their regressions without instrumentation, which is also done here.
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The flexibility of these models comes at the cost of two problems. First,
one needs to represent the smooth functions f• in some manner. One way
to represent these functions is to use cubic regression splines, which is the
approach adopted in this study. A cubic regression spline is a curve con-
structed from sections of cubic polynomials that are joined together so that
the resulting curve is continuous up to the second derivative. The points at
which sections are joined (and the end points) are the knots of the spline,
and these locations must be chosen. The spline can be represented in terms
of its values at the knots.15 Second, the amount of smoothness that functions
f• will have needs to be chosen. Overfit is to be avoided and, thus, departure
from smoothness is penalized. The appropriate degree of smoothness for f•
can be estimated from the data by, for example, maximum likelihood.
Illustration
Consider a model containing only one smooth function of one covariate:
yi = f(xi) + ǫi, where ǫi are i.i.d. N(0, σ
2) random variables. To estimate
function f here, f is represented so that the model becomes a linear model.
This is possible by choosing a basis, defining the space of functions of which
f (or a close approximation to it) is an element. In practice, one chooses
basis functions, which are treated as known.
Assume that the function f has a representation f(x) =
∑k
j=1 bj(x)βj,
where βj are unknown parameters and bj(x) are known basis functions. Using
a chosen basis for f implies that we have a linear model y =Xβ+ ǫ, where
the model matrix X can be represented using basis functions such as those
in the cubic regression spline basis. The departure from smoothness can
be penalized with
∫
f ′′(x)2dx. The penalty
∫
f ′′(x)2dx can be expressed as
βTSβ, where S is a coefficient matrix that can be expressed in terms of the
known basis functions.
The penalized regression spline fitting problem is to minimize ‖y −Xβ‖2+
λβTSβ, with respect to β. The problem of estimating the degree of smooth-
ness is a problem of estimating the smoothing parameter λ.16 The pen-
15There are usually two extra conditions that specify that the second derivative of the
curve should be zero at the two end knots.
16In the estimation, one faces a bias–variance tradeoff: on the one hand, the bias should
be small, but on the other hand, the fit should be smooth. One needs to compromise
between the two extremes. λ −→ ∞ results in a straight line estimate for f , and λ = 0
leads to an unpenalized regression spline estimate.
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alized least squares estimator of β, given λ, is βˆ = (XTX + λS)−1XTy.
Thus, the expected value vector is estimated as Ê(y) = µˆ = Ay, where
A =X(XTX + λS)−1XT is called an influence matrix.
This setting can be augmented to include several covariates and smooths.
Given a basis, an additive model is simply a linear model with one or more
associated penalties. Smooths of several variables can also be constructed.
In this paper, tensor product smooths are used in cases of smooths of two
variables (see Appendix C for more information).
Practical notes
The size of basis dimension for each smooth is usually not critical in es-
timation, because it only sets an upper limit on the flexibility of a term.
Smoothing parameters control the effective degrees of freedom (edf ). Effec-
tive degrees of freedom are defined as trace(A), where A is the influence
matrix. The effective degrees of freedom can be used to measure the flexibil-
ity of a model. It is also possible to divide the effective degrees of freedom
into degrees of freedom for each smooth. For example, a simple linear term
would have one degree of freedom, and edf=2.3 can be thought of as a func-
tion that is slightly more complex than a second-degree polynomial.
Confidence (credible) intervals for the model terms can be derived using
Bayesian methods, and approximate p-values for model terms can be calcu-
lated. Models can be compared using information criteria such as the Akaike
information criterion (AIC). When using the AIC for penalized models (mod-
els including smooth terms), the degrees of freedom are the effective degrees
of freedom, not the number of parameters. Moreover, random effects can be
included in these models. For further details, see Wood (2006).17
17The results presented in this study are obtained using the R software package “mgcv”
(version 1.7-21), which includes a function “gam.” Basis construction for cubic regression
splines is used (the knots are placed evenly through the range of covariate values by
default). The maximum likelihood method is used in the selection of the smoothing
parameters. The identifiability constraints (due to, for example, the model’s additive
constant term) are taken into account by default. The function “gam” also allows for
simple random effects: it represents the conventional random effects in a GAM as penalized
regression terms. More details can be found in Wood (2006) and the R project’s web pages
(http://cran.r-project.org/).
9
3. Results
The new top income share series allow for the overall relationship be-
tween top-end inequality and growth to be studied in various ways. First,
this section reports simplified models for very long series using three dif-
ferent time-period specifications. Second, findings based on shorter series
are reported, and these specifications include some usual growth regression
variables. The section ends with additional sensitivity checks.
3.1. Simplified models: long series from the 1920s onward
The simplified models include the top 1% income share (top1 ) and ln(GDP
per capita) as covariates, and the dependent variable is the future log growth
of GDP per capita. The GDP per capita data of Maddison (2010) are used
in these models. The relationship is investigated using annual, 5-year, and
10-year average data. The averaged data are used to mitigate the potential
problems related to short-run disturbances.
The specifications in Table 2 are of the form:
growthi,t+1 = α+ f1(top1it) + f2(ln(GDP p.c.)it) + δdecade + ui + ǫit, and
growthi,t+1 = α+ f12(top1it, ln(GDP p.c.)it) + δdecade + ui + ǫit,
where i refers to a country and t to a time period, α is a constant, functions
f• refer to smooth functions, δdecade refers to a fixed decade effect (one decade
is the reference category), ui refers to a simple country-specific random effect
(ui ∼ N(0, σ
2
u)), and ǫit ∼ N(0, σ
2) is the error term; inequality and GDP
variables are used as period averages (except for annual data).18 The random-
effect specification allows for correlation over time within countries, and the
18In the annual data (t refers to 1920, 1921, ..., 2007), future growth corresponds to the
difference of ln(GDP p.c.) values at t + 1 and t multiplied by 100. In the 5-year average
data the time periods t are 1920–24, 1925–29, ..., 2000–04. The averages of the covariates in
1920–24 are used with the subsequent period’s average annual log growth (calculated using
ln(GDP p.c.) values in 1925–30); the averages of the covariates in 1925–29 are used with
the following period’s average annual log growth (calculated using ln(GDP p.c.) values in
1930–35), and so on. The only exception is the future growth for the last 5-year period
(2000–04): growtht+1 is calculated using ln(GDP p.c.) values in 2005–08 (i.e., average
growth is based on three, not five, growth rates due to data unavailability in Maddison,
2010). Correspondingly, in the 10-year average data, the periods t are 1920–29, 1930–39,
..., 1990–99. The only exception to the logic is the future growth for the last 10-year
period (1990–99): average growth is calculated using ln(GDP p.c.) values in 2000–08 (i.e.,
growtht+1 is not an average of ten annual growth rates but eight). Thus, in the averaged
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results reflect both variations over time within countries and cross-sectional
differences among countries. The random-effect approach is also used by
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) who investigate nonlinearities in the inequality–
growth relationship.19
Univariate smooth functions of the top 1% share and ln(GDP per capita)
are studied in models (1), (3), and (5) of Table 2. Initially, the top 1% share
and ln(GDP per capita) were allowed to enter in a flexible form, but f(top1t)
had effective degrees of freedom equal to one in models (3) and (5). The mod-
els in question were then re-estimated with the assumption that top1 enters
in linear form: the coefficient for the top 1% share is negative and statisti-
cally significant in the 5- and 10-year data. Plot (a) of Figure 1 provides an
illustration of the smooth f(top1t) with the annual data: the smooth function
shows a negative slope (or possibly some U shape). Moreover, plots (b)–(d)
of Figure 1 show an inverse-U shape for the smooth f(ln(GDP p.c.)t).
The bivariate smooths f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) in models (2), (4), and (6)
of Table 2 are visualized in Figure 2. In plots (a1)–(a2) of Figure 2, the
annual data show that although the relationship between top-end inequality
and growth is U-shaped at “medium” levels of economic development, the
negative slope part of the U dominates.20 The U shape is no longer evident
at “high” levels of ln(GDP per capita). Plots (b1)–(b2) and (c1)–(c2) of Fig-
ure 2 show clear similarities in the relationship in the 5- and 10-year average
data. In general, the 5- and 10-year data suggest a negative overall associ-
ation between top-end inequality and future growth; however, the negative
correlation seems to get weaker at the highest levels of ln(GDP per capita),
as can be seen in a comparison of the slope at different levels of ln(GDP per
capita). Furthermore, Figure D.6 in Appendix D provides additional plots
data models, the data points of the dependent and the explanatory variables do not overlap
in the estimation equation. This should rule out direct reverse causation and reduce the
endogeneity problem related to using a (lagged) GDP variable as a regressor.
19Further, Barro (2000) prefers random effects. He points out that differencing in the
fixed-effects approach exacerbates the measurement error problem, particularly for an
inequality variable, for which the variation across countries is important (Barro, 2000). In
addition, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) state that there are no strong grounds for believing
that the omitted variable problem could be solved by adding a fixed effect for each country,
especially in a linear specification (as in, e.g., Forbes, 2000).
20For example, in plot (a1), look at the shape of f at ln(GDP p.c.) ≈ 8 (GDP p.c. ≈
3000 in 1990 int. GK$) or at ln(GDP p.c.) ≈ 8.5 (GDP p.c. ≈ 4900 in 1990 int. GK$).
The negative slope part of the U is more evident.
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Table 2: Simplified models for 23 countries (data from the 1920s onward; GDP data from Maddison, 2010): the effective
degrees of freedom for each smooth and the coefficients for the linear terms. The dependent variable is the average annual log
growth in the subsequent period, where one period is 1, 5, or 10 years. See Figure 1 for illustrations of the univariate smooths
with edf > 1, and Figure 2 for illustrations of the bivariate smooths f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t).
1-year data (N=1269) 5-year average data (N=291) 10-year average data (N=144)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
f(top1t) [edf ≈ 1.7
a]’ - [lineara] -0.137** - [lineara] -0.203*** -
See Fig. 1 (a)
f(ln(GDP p.c.)t) [edf ≈ 2.6a]*** - [edf ≈ 2.6a]*** - [edf ≈ 2.7a]*** -
See Fig. 1 (b) See Fig. 1 (c) See Fig. 1 (d)
f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) - [edf ≈ 12.7
b]*** - [edf ≈ 5.1b]*** - [edf ≈ 5.0b]***
See Fig. 2 (a1)−(a2) See Fig. 2 (b1)−(b2) See Fig. 2 (c1)−(c2)
AIC 7435 7409 1391 1394 520 523
***, **, *, ’ denote significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15% levels, respectively.
The p-values for parametric terms are calculated using the Bayesian estimated covariance matrix of the parameter estimators; only
the significance levels are reported. The smooth terms’ significance levels are based on approximate p-values.
All specifications include decade dummies and random country-specific effects.
aBasis dimension k for the smooth before imposing identifiability constraints is k = 5.
bBasis dimension k for the smooth before imposing identifiability constraints is k = 52 = 25 (tensor product smooth using rank 5
marginals).
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Figure 1: Visualization of the univariate smooths provided in Table 2 (data from the 1920s
onward; GDP data from Maddison, 2010). Each plot presents the smooth function as a
solid line. The plots also show the 95% Bayesian credible intervals as the dashed lines and
the covariate values as a rug plot along the horizontal axis.
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Figure 2: Visualization of the simplified models: smooths f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) in mod-
els (2), (4), and (6) of Table 2 (data from the 1920s onward; GDP data from Maddison,
2010). The horizontal axes have the top 1% income share and ln(GDP per capita); the
vertical axis has the smooth function f . Each smooth is illustrated from two views to
clarify the shape of the smooth. For additional illustrations, see Figure D.6 in Appendix
D.
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that illustrate the regions that are hard to predict with the current data.
In summary, there is no indication of a positive association between top-end
inequality and growth in the medium or long term.
The subset of 17 “advanced” countries was also studied separately to
check that the other six countries in the sample do not drive the main re-
sults.21 The main findings about the top1–growth association accorded with
the whole-sample results. However, stating mechanisms behind the discov-
ered association is more or less guesswork. For example, the initially negative
and then fading association between inequality and growth fits to the latter
stages of the unified theory of Galor and Moav (2004). Moreover, the top
1% share may be a reasonable indicator for mechanisms that reflect the con-
centration of (political and economic) power. Furthermore, the years studied
in this subsection also include the Great Depression and World War II. The
next subsections report further results using data from the 1950s onward.
3.2. Expanded models covering years from 1950 onward
In this subsection, the models are expanded with several typical growth
regression variables. This subsection investigates data averaged over 5 and
10 years because the main interest is in the medium- or long-run relationship,
and the schooling data is available every five years. Note that here the used
GDP per capita series span the years 1950–2009 and are from PWT 7.0 by
Heston et al. (2011). The logic of constructing the averaged data is similar to
that for the simplified models in the previous subsection.22 Before estimating
expanded specifications with additional controls, it was checked that the
results are not driven by the shorter time period (particularly excluding the
war years) and the change of the GDP data source. However, details of these
21Australia, Canada, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. (The other six countries compose a heterogeneous group.)
22Here, the 5-year periods t are 1950–54, 1955–59, ..., 2000–04. The logic of constructing
the averaged data is described also in footnote 18. As before, the only exception relates to
the future growth for the last 5-year period (2000–04): due to data unavailability in PWT
7.0, growtht+1 is calculated using ln(GDP p.c.) values in 2005–2009 (i.e., average growth
is based on four annual growth rates instead of five). Similarly, in the 10-year average
data, the periods t are 1950–59, 1960–69, ..., 1990–99, and here the only exception is the
future growth for the last 10-year period (1990–99): growtht+1 is based on ln(GDP p.c.)
values in 2000–09 (i.e., it is based on nine growth rates instead of ten).
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checks are omitted for the sake of brevity.23
3.2.1. Whole-sample results
Two types of specifications are reported in Table 3. In models (1) and
(3), all covariates enter the model having univariate smooths:
growthi,t+1 = α+ f1(top1it) + f2(ln(GDP p.c.)it) + f3(schoolingit)
+f4(government consumptionit) + f5(price level of investmentit)
+f6(opennessit) + f7(investmentit) + δdecade + ui + ǫit,
where i refers to a country and t to a time period, α is a constant, functions
f• refer to smooth functions, δdecade refers to a fixed decade effect (one decade
is the reference category), ui is the country-specific random effect, and ǫit is
the conventional error term; variable values are period averages. Moreover, in
models (2) and (4), a flexible interaction between top-end inequality and per
capita GDP is allowed with a smooth of two variables: instead of f1(top1it)+
f2(ln(GDP p.c.)it), a bivariate smooth f12(top1it, ln(GDP p.c.)it) enters the
specification. Again, linear terms are reported in the models of Table 3 when
linearity was suggested in the initial stage of the estimation.
Models (1) and (3) in Table 3 do not allow for interaction between top1
and the level of economic development. In model (1), the 5-year data sug-
gest that the smooth f(top1t) is not statistically significant (the relationship
between top1 and growth can be negative or slightly U shaped; see plot (a)
of Figure E.8 in Appendix E). In model (3), the 10-year data suggest a
linear relationship with a negative coefficient that is statistically significant.
However, models (2) and (4) with smooth f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) illustrate
a more complex relationship.
Figure 3 provides illustrations of the smooths f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) in
models (2) and (4) of Table 3. In model (2) (see plots (a1)–(a2)), the 5-year
data suggest that as the GDP per capita increases toward the “medium”
levels of economic development, top-end inequality is in a slightly U-shaped
23In these checks, simplified specifications were estimated with the data from 1950 on-
ward (i.e., models similar to those in Table 2, but using the GDP data from PWT 7.0).
The results with the 5- and 10-year average data were qualitatively similar to those in
subsection 3.1. Although the medium or long run is the focus of this study, the results
with the annual data were also checked (in this case t refers to 1950, 1951, ..., 2008). The
annual data showed a U-shaped association between top1 and growth at “medium” levels
of GDP per capita.
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Table 3: Expanded models for 23 countries (data from the 1950s onward; GDP data from PWT 7.0): the effective degrees of
freedom for each smooth and the coefficients for the linear terms. The dependent variable is the average annual log growth
in the subsequent period, where one period is 5 or 10 years. The bivariate smooths f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) are illustrated in
Figure 3. The univariate smooths with edf > 1 are illustrated in Figure E.8 in Appendix E.
5-year average data (N=204) 10-year average data (N=96)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
f(top1t) [edf ≈ 2.0
a] - [lineara] -0.220*** -
See Fig. E.8 (a)
f(ln(GDP p.c.)t) [edf ≈ 2.3a]*** - [edf ≈ 1.4a] -
See Fig. E.8 (b) See Fig. E.8 (d)
f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) - [edf ≈ 7.2
b]*** - [edf ≈ 3.0b,c]***
See Fig. 3 (a1)−(a2) See Fig. 3 (b1)−(b2)
f(gov’t consumptiont) [linear
a] 0.155*** [lineara] 0.158*** [lineara] 0.108** [lineara] 0.097*
f(schoolingt) [linear
a] 0.093 [lineara] 0.180 [edf ≈ 2.8a] [edf ≈ 2.9a]’
See Fig. E.8 (e) See Fig. E.8 (h)
f(price of investmentt) [linear
a] -0.015*** [lineara] -0.013** [edf ≈ 2.9a]** [edf ≈ 2.7a]’
See Fig. E.8 (f) See Fig. E.8 (i)
f(opennesst) [linear
a] 0.003 [lineara] 0.005* [edf ≈ 1.7a]’ [lineara] 0.007**
See Fig. E.8 (g)
f(investmentt) [edf ≈ 1.7a] [lineara] 0.031 [lineara] 0.016 [lineara] 0.020
See Fig. E.8 (c)
AIC 749 752 319 321
***, **, *, ’ indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10, and 15% levels, respectively.
The p-values for parametric terms are calculated using the Bayesian estimated covariance matrix of the parameter estimators; only
the significance levels are reported. The smooth terms’ significance levels are based on approximate p-values.
All specifications include decade dummies and random country-specific effects.
aBasis dimension k for the smooth before imposing identifiability constraints is k = 5.
bBasis dimension k for the smooth before imposing identifiability constraints is k = 52 = 25 (tensor product smooth with rank 5
marginals).
cWith 3 degrees of freedom, the tensor product smooth refers to θ1top1t + θ2ln(GDP p.c.)t + θ3top1tln(GDP p.c.)t, where θ• are
coefficients. When model (4) is estimated using this specification in place of f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t), the obtained coefficients are
θˆ1 = −0.922*, θˆ2 = −1.266**, and θˆ3 = 0.077. For example, if GDP p.c. is 8100 (2005 I$), then ln(GDP p.c.) ≈ 9, and the slope
with respect to top1 is approximately −0.23. Correspondingly, if GDP p.c. is 22000 (2005 I$), then ln(GDP p.c.) ≈ 10, and the
slope is approximately −0.15. This change in the slope is illustrated in plots (b1)–(b2) of Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Visualization of the expanded models: smooths f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) in mod-
els (2) and (4) of Table 3 (data from the 1950s onward; GDP data from PWT 7.0). The
horizontal axes have the top 1% income share and ln(GDP per capita); the vertical axis has
the smooth f . The smooths are illustrated from two views. For additional illustrations,
see Figure E.7 in Appendix E.
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relationship to growth; however, the negative slope of this U dominates. The
U shape fades at even higher levels of GDP per capita. In model (4) (see plots
(b1)–(b2)), the 10-year data show a negative relationship between top-end
inequality and growth; however, these data also show that the association
may start to fade at the highest levels of GDP per capita (see also note
c to Table 3). Additional plots of these bivariate smooths are provided in
Figure E.7 in Appendix E.
Causal channels are not in the focus of the current study, but it is tempt-
ing to speculate about the results of the models in Table 3. Although the
models include, for example, investment and education variables, the data
still indicate a relationship between top-end inequality and growth, and this
association may depend on the country’s level of economic development.
Some mechanisms related to polarization of power might provide (at least a
partial) explanation. Moreover, it is noteworthy that all models of Table 3
suggest a positive association between government consumption and growth.
In summary, this subsection demonstrates that the main findings in the
10-year data are robust to the inclusion of several controls. In compari-
son, the 5-year data show some discrepancies compared to simplified models.
These disparities arise at “medium” levels of economic development: the
shape of the smooth f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) in plots (a1)–(a2) of Figure 3
differs from the shape shown in plots (b1)–(b2) of Figure 2; a slight U shape
arises after including more covariates (recall discussion at the beginning of
section 3.2 and footnote 23). The next subsection provides additional sen-
sitivity checks and discusses the discovered U shape at “medium” levels of
economic development in the 5-year data.
3.2.2. Sensitivity of the expanded models’ results
The sensitivity of the whole-sample results is assessed from different as-
pects. The first checks relate to the composition of the sample. The subse-
quent robustness check involves the set of control variables in the expanded
models. Finally, an alternative per capita GDP series is tested.
For the first step, 5-year specifications similar to models (1) and (2) of Ta-
ble 3 were fitted separately for the English-speaking, Nordic, Continental and
Southern European, and “less-advanced” countries.24 Results for the Conti-
24English-speaking: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and
the United States (N=61). Nordic: Finland, Norway, and Sweden (N=33). Continental
and Southern European: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and
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nental and Southern European countries suggested a negative link between
top-end inequality and growth. A negative (or slightly U-shaped) relation-
ship was found for the Nordic countries. For the English-speaking countries, a
negative (or slightly inverse-U-shaped) association between top1 and growth
was discovered. Furthermore, the small and very heterogeneous sample of
“less-advanced” countries indicated a positive association between top-end
inequality and growth, but the relationship was not statistically significant.
These group-wise findings can help explain the U shape between top-end in-
equality and growth at “medium” levels of economic development (see plots
(a1)–(a2) of Figure 3). It is possible that the association between top-end
inequality and growth is different in “less-advanced” and “advanced” coun-
tries, at least in the medium term (in the 5-year data in this case). However,
this result for “less-advanced” economies is tentative and should be tested
with a larger sample when new data become available.
For the second step, Japan and the English-speaking, Continental and
Southern European, and Nordic countries (17 countries in total) were used
to represent “advanced,” wealthy countries. The association between top-end
inequality and growth was not statistically significant in the 5-year data, but
the results indicated that the relationship would be “negative but fading.”
This is in line with the whole-sample results at the highest levels of ln(GDP
per capita). The “fading link” may also provide an explanation for why
many results for the top 1% income shares are not significant in Andrews et
al. (2011), who study 12 wealthy countries.
For the next step, more parsimonious versions of the specifications in Ta-
ble 3 were estimated. The so-called Perotti-style specifications are often used
in inequality–growth estimations: in addition to inequality and GDP vari-
ables, they include schooling and price-of-investment variables. The results
of these parsimonious models were in line with the previous findings. The
detailed results are not reported for conciseness.
Finally, the robustness was checked with respect to the chosen GDP series,
because PWT 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011) provides alternatives. The specifi-
cations in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 were estimated using alternative
series, and the overall patterns were similar to those reported above with the
Switzerland (N=55). “Less-advanced:” Argentina, China, India, Indonesia, and South
Africa (N=35). Note that Japan (N=11) and Singapore (N=9) are difficult to fit into
these categories.
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5- and 10-year data.25 Thus, the main results should not be driven by the
choice of the GDP per capita series.
4. Conclusions
Various studies have discussed the relationship between inequality and
subsequent growth. However, this study takes a novel approach to this ques-
tion by exploiting new inequality series on top 1% income shares and focusing
on possible nonlinearities. Penalized splines are used to circumvent problems
related to prespecified functional forms, and a complex interaction between
top-end inequality and economic development is allowed in many specifica-
tions.
The main results of this study relate to currently “advanced” economies,
for which a pattern is found in data averaged over 5- and 10-year periods;
the overall association between top-end inequality and growth appears to be
negative, but this relationship may become weaker in the course of economic
development. Although the current study refrains from making causal claims,
the findings accord with the growing literature, suggesting that high inequal-
ity does not foster growth in the long run. Moreover, the main results of this
study should not be generalized to all types of economies—“less-advanced”
economies need to be studied further when more data become available. It
will also be interesting to see how the recent economic downturn appears in
the results of future studies.
25The series “rgdpch” from PWT 7.0 data was tested. This series refers to “PPP con-
verted GDP per capita (chain series), at 2005 constant prices.”
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Appendix A. Information on the top 1% income share series
This is a list of the countries and sources for the top 1% income share series used in this study.26 For
better comparability, series “without capital gains” have been selected when possible. See the source for
more details on the series. The 5-year average series are presented in Figure A.4 below.
1. Argentina: Alvaredo (2010a): Table 6.5, years 1932–2004.
2. Australia: Atkinson & Leigh (2007a): Table 7.1, years 1921–2002; Leigh (2010): Excel file, years
2003–2007.
3. Canada: Saez & Veall (2007): Table 6B.1, years 1920–2000.
4. China: Atkinson et al. (2010): Table 13A.12, years 1986–2003.27
5. Finland: Jäntti et al. (2010): Table 8A.2 (taxable income/population), years 1920–1992; Riihelä,
M. (2011): updated figures, years 1993–2008.28
6. France: Piketty (2007): Table 3A.1, years 1920–1995; Landais (2008): Excel file, years 1996–2006.
7. Germany: Dell (2007): Table 9I.6, years 1925–1998.
8. India: Banerjee & Piketty (2010): Table 1A.5, years 1922–1999.
9. Indonesia: Leigh & van der Eng (2010): Table 4.1, years 1921–1939, 1982–2004.
10. Ireland: Nolan (2007): Table 12.5, years 1938, 1943, 1975–2000.
11. Italy: Atkinson et al. (2010): Table 13A.22, years 1974–2005.29
12. Japan: Moriguchi & Saez (2010): Table 3A.2, years 1920–2005.
13. Netherlands: Salverda & Atkinson (2007): Table 10.2, years 1920–1999.
14. New Zealand: Atkinson et al. (2010): Table 13A.6, years 1921–2005.30
15. Norway: Aaberge & Atkinson (2010): Table 9.1, years 1929–2006.
16. Portugal: Alvaredo (2010b): Table 11D.1, years 1976–2005. Note: figures 1976–1982 have been
updated to equal figures provided on the website by Alvaredo et al. (2011) (Feb 18, 2011).
17. Singapore: Atkinson et al. (2010): Table 13A.15, years 1950–2005.31 (Note. top1 data also
available for 1947–1949, but GDP data not available.)
18. South Africa: Alvaredo & Atkinson (2010): Table A.5B & Table A.5C, years 1950–1993 &
2002–2007. (Note. top1 data also available for 1944–1949, but GDP data not available.)
19. Spain: Alvaredo & Saez (2010): Table 10D.2, years 1981–2005.
20. Sweden: Roine & Waldenström (2010): Table 7A.2, years 1920–2006.
21. Switzerland: Atkinson et al. (2010): Table 13A.9, years 1933–1996.32
22. United Kingdom: Atkinson et al. (2010): Table 13A.2, years 1937, 1949–2005.33
23. United States: Saez (2010): Excel file, Table A1, years 1920–2008.34
26The data correspond to the available series at the end of 2010/beginning of 2011. Most figures are
collected from the two volumes edited by Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010). The original series in the
first volume is referred to where the series had not been updated for the second volume. After collecting
the data, the series were published in the World Top Incomes Database (Alvaredo et al., 2011). Currently,
the updated data are available in the World Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo et al., 2015).
27For more information and the original series, see Piketty and Qian (2010).
28Figures 1993–2008 received directly from Marja Riihelä by email (Feb 11, 2011).
29For more information and the original series, see Alvaredo and Pisano (2010).
30For more information and the original series, see Atkinson and Leigh (2007b).
31For more information and the original series, see Atkinson (2010).
32In the original source: For all years except 1933, the estimates relate to income averaged over the
year shown and the following year (for more information, see also Dell et al., 2007). Thus, the same value
is repeated for two successive years in the current study.
33For more information and the original series, see Atkinson (2007b).
34For more information and the original series, see Piketty and Saez (2007).
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Figure A.4: Top 1% income shares for each country (5-year average data used in models
of Table 2; the time periods are 1920–24, 1925–29, ..., and 2000–04). Data sources: see
list of countries in this appendix.
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Appendix B. Information on other variables
Long series, simplified models (annual observations span 1920–2008):
– GDP per capita, 1990 international GK$; Maddison (2010). See Figure B.5 for illustration.
Expanded models (annual observations span 1950–2009):
– GDP per capita: PPP converted GDP per capita (Laspeyres), derived from growth rates of domestic
absorption, at 2005 constant prices (2005 I$/person); PWT 7.0 by Heston et al. (2011) (“rgdpl2”)
– Government consumption share of PPP converted GDP per capita at current prices (%); PWT 7.0 by
Heston et al. (2011) (“cg”)
– Investment share of PPP converted GDP per capita at current prices (%); PWT 7.0 by Heston et al.
(2011) (“ci”)
– Openness at current prices (%); PWT 7.0 by Heston et al. (2011) (“openc”)
– Price level of investment (PPP over investment/XRAT, where XRAT is national currency units per US
dollar); PWT 7.0 by Heston et al. (2011) (“pi”)
– Average years of secondary schooling for total population (population aged 25 and over); Barro and
Lee (2010); available every five years starting from 1950
– Note: “China Version 2” data from PWT 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011) is used.
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Figure B.5: Level of economic development for each country (5-year average data used in
models of Table 2; the time periods are 1920–24, 1925–29, ..., and 2000–04). Data source:
Maddison (2010).
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Appendix C. Tensor product smooths
This appendix provides additional information to subsection 2.2. Tensor product
smooths are recommended if one uses a smooth that contains more than one variable,
but the scales of those variables are fundamentally different (i.e., measured in different
units). Smooths of several variables are constructed from marginal smooths using the
tensor product construction. The basic idea of a smooth function of two covariates is
provided as an example.
Consider a smooth comprised of two covariates, x and z. Assume that we have low-
rank bases to represent smooth functions fx and fz of the covariates. We can then write:
fx(x) =
I∑
i=1
αiai(x) and fz(z) =
L∑
l=1
δldl(z),
where αi and δl are parameters, and the ai(x) and dl(z) are known (chosen) basis functions
such as those in the cubic regression spline basis.
Consider then the smooth function fx. We want to convert it to a smooth function of
both x and z. This can be done by allowing the parameters αi to vary smoothly with z.
We can write:
αi(z) =
L∑
l=1
δildl(z),
and the tensor product basis construction gives:
fxz(x, z) =
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
δildl(z)ai(x).
The tensor product smooth has a penalty for each marginal basis. For further technical
details, see Wood (2006).
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Appendix D. Additional information, simplified models
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(a1) 1−year data,
 model (2), view 1
top1
5
10
15
20
ln(
GD
P p
.
c.
)
7
8
9
10
f(top1,ln(GDP p
.c.))
−2
−1
0
1
2
(b1) 5−year average data,
 model (4), view 1
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(c1) 10−year average data,
 model (6), view 1
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 model (2), view 2
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(b2) 5−year average data,
 model (4), view 2
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Figure D.6: Visualization of the simplified models: smooths f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) in models (2), (4),
and (6) of Table 2 (data from the 1920s onward; GDP data from Maddison, 2010). The horizontal axes
have the top 1% income share and ln(GDP per capita); the vertical axis has the smooth f . Each smooth
is illustrated from two views. In all plots, plot grid nodes that are too far from the true data points of
the top 1% share and ln(GDP per capita) are excluded: the grid has been scaled into the unit square
along with top1 and GDP variables; grid nodes more than 0.1 from the predictor variables are excluded.
Compare to Figure 2.
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Appendix E. Additional information, expanded models
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 model (4), view 1
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Figure E.7: Visualization of the expanded models: smooths f(top1t, ln(GDP p.c.)t) in models (2) and
(4) of Table 3 (data from the 1950s onward; GDP data from PWT 7.0). The horizontal axes have the top
1% share and ln(GDP per capita); the vertical axis has the smooth f . The smooths are illustrated from
two views. In all plots, plot grid nodes that are too far from the true data points of the top 1% share and
ln(GDP per capita) are excluded: the grid has been scaled into the unit square along with top1 and GDP
variables; grid nodes more than 0.1 from the predictor variables are excluded. Compare to Figure 3.
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Figure E.8: Visualization of the expanded models: univariate smooths provided in Table 3
(data from the 1950s onward; GDP data from PWT 7.0). Each plot presents the smooth
function as a solid line. The plots also show the 95% Bayesian credible intervals as the
dashed lines and the covariate values as a rug plot along the horizontal axis.
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